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Abstract 
The phenomenon of migration is a highly debated topic in international politics, 
rising in importance on the global agenda. This can be seen in the securitisation of 
migration policies of the EU, who has sought to restrict migration and sharpen 
border controls since mid-70s. In this process Turkey is of vital importance, 
considered one of the main ‘bridges’ for transit migration into the EU. Thus, the 
securitisation of migration in the EU has been influencing the Turkish migration 
management in the relation between the two. This thesis was conducted through 
nine weeks of fieldwork in Edirne, a city bordering the EU through Greece and 
Bulgaria. The aim is to look at how the process of securitisation is articulated in 
both discourse and practices among local migration practitioners. This has been 
done by unstructured interviews with local migration practitioners in Edirne. This 
thesis is following the framework of both Copenhagen and Paris School of 
securitisation, to locate how the process of securitisation is present in Edirne. 
An outline of the main communication in the EU-Turkey relation, and the 
policy development of both, with regards to migration management, has been 
made. It concludes that the process of securitisation of migration is highly present 
in both discourses and practices of local migration practitioners in Edirne, and 
locates the process within the concepts of securitisation theory. It also shows 
tensions between adaption of the securitised agenda of the EU and the resistance 
expressed towards the EU’s migration policies.  
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1 Introduction 
“Turkey is a bridge between some Middle East and Asian countries [...], where 
conflicts and unsustainability prevail, and the European Countries with high 
welfare and human rights standards at west. Turkey is the transit point for the 
migrants aiming to go to European Union (EU) countries for some reasons such 
as conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in neighbour countries, political and 
economic instabilities, mountainous and hard-to-control east borders, 
geographical structure of Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Coast eligible for 
illegal transit. Turkey has become an attraction place for regular and irregular 
migration, particularly due to its recently increasing economic and regional 
power. Given all these factors, migration deeply affects the economic, socio-
cultural and demographic structure of Turkey, as well as its public order and 
security.” (Directorate General of Migration Management1 1, 2015) 
1.1 Background and Aim 
As the quote above reflects, migration is indeed a global phenomenon, rising in 
importance in international politics. In the European Union the focus is 
increasingly put on irregular migration, and how to prevent migrants from 
entering the Union in illegal2 ways. This emphasis is placed heavily upon securing 
the external borders, showing a shift in regarding the issue of migration from a 
security perspective rather than a humanitarian one (Kirişci 2003). The project of 
creating a strong, common European framework of migration and border 
management has had implications far beyond the borders of the EU. It has also 
earned it the nickname of ‘Fortress Europe’.  
In this context Turkey, holding the position as a Candidate Country since 1999 
and considered a ’bridge’ for transit migration to the EU, becomes central in the 
Unions concerns for migration flows. Argued throughout this thesis is that the 
securitisation of migration present in EU discourse has effects on the Turkish 
migration management system, both on a national and local level. The aim here is 
to see how this is visible, by focusing on the case of migration management in 
Edirne, a city bordering the EU through its land borders with Greece and 
Bulgaria.  
The aim will not be to provide a comprehensive analysis of the macro-level of 
securitising influence of EU on Turkey, but this is a necessary background that 
will be accounted for through documents and previous research. Emphasis will be 
                                                
1 Which will further on be referred to as DGMM, goc.gov.tr  
2 As well as legal. 
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put on the development of Turkish migration management, which before 2013 
was highly fragmented in different institutions and legislative documents. This 
leads us to why an emphasis on local practitioners is so vital, which is what will 
be studied in the case of Edirne.  
Following the framework of securitisation theory and thus regarding security 
threats as constructed through a discursive process, the securitising influence of 
the EU will be examined within the perception and description of migration 
management of local practitioners in Edirne. A combination of the Copenhagen 
and Paris School of securitisation will be used, to highlight the process within 
both discourse and practice.  
1.2 Research Question  
- How is the process of securitisation visible in the discourse on and practices of 
migration management among local migration practitioners in Edirne? 
1.3 Previous Research and Significance  
Both Waever and authors associated with the Copenhagen School (Waever et al 
1998, Buzan et al 1993, Waever 2011) and with the Paris School (Bigo and Guild 
2005, Bigo 2002, Bigo 2009, Geiger and Pécoud 2010) have studied 
securitisation. A large body of works have discussed the effects on securitisation 
of migration within the EU, from the theoretical angles of both schools 
(Huysmans 2000, Léonard 2010, Benam 2011, Bigo, Carrera and Guild 2008, 
Watson 2009). These will be presented more thoroughly in section 4, and a 
discussion on the main trends in EU migration management will be presented.  
The relationship between Turkey and the EU has been scrutinised within the 
fields of International Relations and Security Studies, as well as in more 
management and policy-oriented works. In particular it is the influence of the EU 
on Turkish migration policy that has been studied (Bürgin 2011, Cavlak 2013, 
Kirişci 2003, İçduygu 2011, Kaya 2009) and the conditionalities within the 
accession process (Erkut and Özgen 2006, Emerson and Tucci 2004, Toğral 
2012). Some of the main aspects of EU-Turkey and securitisation will also be 
outlined in section 4. Work that directly links Turkey and securitisation, both 
practices and discourse have also started to emerge, however it is still a relatively 
new field of research (Biehl 2009, Toğral 2012, Tolay 2012, Baysan 2013).  
This brings us to the significance of this thesis. Within these wider academic 
debates and works on the EU, Turkey and securitisation, few have been made in a 
limited, local context. Only one recent study has been published on the topic of 
European influence over migration management in a local setting (Aras3 2013). A 
                                                
3 Which was conducted in Edirne and Izmir.  
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study on the relation between Turkey and Greece concerned with similar topics 
has also been partly published, and will be published in its entirety later this year 
(Kaşli 2014).  
By using Edirne as location and combining the theoretical focus of both 
discourse and practice, new insights can be made in how the process of 
securitisation is shown and constructed in local migration management. Edirne is 
a highly specific setting and “still by far the undisputed hotspot for detections of 
illegal border crossings” (Frontex, 2013a), with its closeness to the EU border 
shaping the area. Analysing securitisation in this particular context accommodate 
deeper understanding of the levels of securitisation, communicated in a complex 
web of micro-macro networks in discourse and practice. Thus, this is a significant 
case to shed light on within the debate of securitisation of migration and 
international relations.  
1.4 Delimitations  
The current situation in Turkey with the Syrian crisis since 2011 is something that 
has not been emphasised in this paper. Though an important situation it does not 
hold conceptual relevance to this study, as the aim is not migration per se but the 
issues surrounding it. Describing the Syrian crisis would also requisite thorough 
reflections of Turkey-Syria relations, with special regards to the historic roots of 
the Ottoman Empire. This is not possible to outline in this thesis, neither is it 
relevant in EU-Turkey relations apart from Turkey’s role as a regional power. 
Equally important, my knowledge and experience is not enough for attempting to 
describe or access a vulnerable group such as Syrian transit migrants in Turkey. I 
neither had time nor resources to provide a fair account on the voices of migrants 
in a way that is not colonising their experiences (England 1994). 
If space had been more available a deeper focus would have been put on the 
process of securitisation within the EU-Turkey communication. This is outlined in 
chapter 4, but is due to the scope and aim of this thesis highly limited. A deeper 
and more comprehensive focus would also have been put on the specificities of 
the Turkish context and its internal dynamics of securitisation of migration and 
development of migration management. As it is now the emphasis is put on this 
within the relation between EU and Turkey, not examining the independent 
dynamics of securitisation within Turkey.  
The choice of not focusing this study further on the political economy of 
migration between EU and Turkey, with regards to transit migration, was also 
made. This is highly relevant for examining the root causes of the securitisation of 
migration within EU-Turkey dialogue, but is beyond the scope of this paper.  
1.5 Outline of the Study 
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The following chapter will describe the methodology used in this fieldwork and 
following thesis, and provide reflections on the material and ethical considerations 
of the study. Chapter 3 will introduce the theoretical framework and the key 
concepts of this thesis. Chapter 4 will bring a review of EU-Turkey relations and 
the main developments of migration policy for both, in the light of the theoretical 
framework. Chapter 5 will present the material from Edirne, and the analysis of it 
from the key concepts of securitisation theory. In chapter 6, the main conclusions 
will be presented.  
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2 Methodology  
2.1 Research Design  
This thesis is based on a fieldwork conducted predominantly in Edirne, Turkey for 
nine weeks during January to March 2015. Some time was also spent in Istanbul 
and Ankara. The study is conducted as a qualitative, exploratory case study that 
looks at a well-documented theory to see how it applies in a new, different setting. 
The epistemological position is interpretivist, as described by Bryman (2012:280) 
as a feature for qualitative research where emphasis is put on context and process. 
The need to distinguish this as a case study comes from the elements of extremity 
underlining migration and –management in Edirne. While this thesis is concerned 
with a process that theoretically could be located among migration practitioners in 
another Turkish city or over a less location-specific spectra, it is the uniqueness of 
Edirne in its geographical location and context that constitute the unit of analysis 
(Bryman 2012:68).  It is thus more of an ‘extreme case study’, however hard to 
locate among any set ‘types of case studies’ (Bryman 2012:70). It can also be 
defined as a critical case study, defined as “a case with strategic importance to the 
general problem” (Baškarada 2014:6).  
It is important to highlight the constructivist approach used in this thesis, 
where the ontological position concludes that social phenomena and their 
meanings are accomplished by social actors (Bryman 2012:711). Theoretically 
there is an underlining consideration of discourse and security as constructed, 
rejecting the objectivist stands of an independent social world (Watson 2009:15). 
A slightly more deductive approach has been applied, as the aim throughout was 
to conduct the research within the framework of securitisation theory with 
indicators of securitisation developed prior to the fieldwork. However, a 
hypothesis was not developed prior, neither was the aim to confirm any ‘given’ 
reality. The study was conducted neither deductive nor inductive, but by using 
elements of both thus leaning towards the use of a hermeneutic approach. To 
conclude, this study is highly theory-driven, but also conducted with an explicit 
aim of letting the material speak for itself.  
2.1.1 Selection of location 
As described above Edirne has a unique relevance for a fieldwork, and the choice 
of it was initially made due to its geographical location as the closest Turkish city 
bordering Greece and Bulgaria and thus the EU. The city is also located about 10 
km from the Greek construction of a land border fence, commonly regarded as a 
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symbol for ‘Fortress Europe’4 (Amnesty International 2014). Further, Edirne is 
repeatedly mentioned as a location of importance in NGO reports on migration 
and border issues in the EU (ibid, FIDH et al 2014, Pro Asyl 2013) but in my 
initial review on previous literature I found none made in the region. I was thus 
intrigued to conduct my study here, and to further specialise the focus on local 
migration and border management in this particular context.  
2.2 Collection of Material  
The main empirical material collected during the fieldwork was through 
unstructured interviews. Actively, the respondents were also asked for further 
material, and some PowerPoints explaining migration and border management in 
Edirne and Turkey was provided. Brief reviews of the main communications 
between EU and Turkey have been made, exemplifying the process of 
securitisation within the relation. These were chosen through comprehensive 
readings of previous research on the topics, which highlighted the relevant 
documents. The documents were not analysed further, except for brief readings 
following the coding-system explained below.  
2.2.1 Sampling  
Purposive sampling was used for this fieldwork, as is most common in qualitative 
research (Bryman 2012:418). Focusing on local migration practitioners, the initial 
aim was to contact as many as possible working with migration management in 
Edirne, and to complement that material with individuals working within civil 
society on migration matters. This developed as to include local politicians, 
realising their potential in commenting on the political situation. 
As described in Bryman (2012:424) a mix of snowball sampling and 
opportunistic sampling was made. The focus was throughout to interview people 
of relevance in migration matters, which was realised both with direct contact of 
identified persons and by being introduced to such. I was lucky to gain access to a 
gatekeeper who made this study possible by her kindness and extraordinary social 
network in Edirne. 
Thus, the sampling led to a number of fifteen interviews conducted, with local 
administration at the Edirne Detention Centre (DC), local politicians, members of 
civil society, a representative of the municipality and the Governor of Edirne. 
Two interviews were also conducted in Ankara, one with a national Turkish 
NGO5 and one with a representative of the Border Management Agency (BMA) at 
                                                
4 This fence is also part of the reason (and at least a symbol) for the increased deaths of migrants at the 
Mediterranean Sea, since the increased border security in this land border region has led to a ”displacement 
effect” of migrants, who instead attempt to cross to the EU over the sea (Frontex 2013a).  
5 Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants.   
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the Ministry of Interior. These were made to complement and access further 
information on the situation for migrants and border management in Edirne.  
Unfortunately, access to respondents involved in border management and 
more explicitly security related professions in Edirne (such as Police or Military), 
which would have been very rewarding for my sample, were not possible. I 
received a permission to conduct interviews with the administration at the DC 
from the Governor of Edirne, but he was not able to grant access to others, which 
are under the authority of Ankara.  
2.2.2 Interviews  
The interviews were conducted at separate, and in some cases multiple, occasions. 
At the DC, I was assigned a guide who spoke English to show me around and 
answer my questions while visiting. Multiple respondents with different roles at 
the DC was then interviewed, but their answers have been clouded to the category 
of ‘administration of the DC’, due to the differing nature of their response and 
some requests for exclusion of names. The interviews made at the DC with the 
present and former Director however, are regarded as separate.  
Unstructured interviews were made, following a thematic interview guide 
developed in relation to the framework of securitisation theory, migration 
management and EU-Turkey relations. The initial aim was to conduct them as 
semi-structured, but that quickly changed when arriving to Edirne. Realising my 
limited knowledge and experience of the context, and the different positions my 
respondents held in migration management in Edirne, unstructured interviews was 
regarded as better as to avoid skewing the results from my own assumptions.  
The main themes of the interviews were transit migration in Edirne and 
Turkey as a whole, relations with EU, perceived changes and effects of transit 
migration and EU policy, security, all focused on opinions and perceptions. 
Further inquiries were, with relevant people, made on practices and regional 
cooperation of migration management. 
2.2.3 Additional documents  
The BMA representative in Ankara and the Edirne DC provided me with 
additional documents on request. These documents were in the form of 
PowerPoints used as presentations at different meetings, where the three most 
significant were from a Frontex meeting, a bilateral Turkey-Greece meeting and a 
local Edirne-Greece monthly meeting. These are just fragments of the internal 
dialogue within the cooperation efforts, but are in this thesis regarded as 
significant in seeing how migration matters are presented within the security field 
of Turkish cooperation. They also contained valuable data that would not 
otherwise been accessed, due to the need of obtaining a formal research 
permission to access data from Ankara. 
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2.3 Analysis of Material  
2.3.1 Coding  
The interview guide used followed the initial objective of conducting semi-
structured interviews, but was equally valid as a tool for guiding the main themes 
discussed when the interviews were conducted as unstructured. The initial, open 
coding followed these indicators of securitisation and emphasis was put on openly 
coding the themes of this thesis. The scale of ‘non-politicised–politicised–
securitised’ that will be presented in chapter 3 was also used to grasp an initial 
sense of the material and its relation to securitisation. Things relating to practices 
and EU were also highlighted. 
A second coding was then made to see how and where the material was 
relating to the concepts used in securitisation theory, and categorised as such. 
These categories included for example ‘referent objects’, ‘threats’, ‘audience-
actor relation’, and are presented in chapter 5. This selective coding was 
developed from the compiled open-coded material, and the material was 
throughout placed under categories of respondents, such as ‘local politicians’, 
‘civil society’ and ‘local administration’6. This was due to the significance of the 
position the respondents held in the local migration management system.  
2.4 Reflections on Material 
By using material not only from interviews but official documents and previous 
research, I am confident with the validity of this material. The presented quotes 
and preceding analysis of material showed similar trends and expressions 
throughout, and the material presented reflects this.  
Approximately half of the interviews were conducted in Turkish with a 
translator, and half in English. This of course has had implications for the 
material, and I have throughout been very careful with analysing and looking at 
the material. Further, recordings of the interviews were done, and the ones 
conducted in Turkish with translator were sent to a second translator who 
translated and transcribed them in their entirety. These measure, alongside with 
repeated clarifications made during the interviews, makes me confident that the 
language barrier has been crossed as smoothly as possible. 
2.4.1 Ethical considerations and positionality  
To return to the question of anonymity for my respondents, only one respondent 
requested anonymity. However, I have chosen to not include any names of 
                                                
6 The coding scheme can be made available on request.  
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respondents in this thesis. The importance lies in their occupation and not their 
identity, and I have chosen to take this precaution since there is no relevance in 
their names. Some of my respondents are of course identifiable through their 
occupation, but I remain confident that they will not face any consequences, 
which was also discussed with all respondents. 
My role as a European was visible in all contacts made during the fieldwork, 
opening a lot of doors and making me receive a lot of help, but it was also 
restraining. More information and locations were accessed due to my role as a 
young, European student, and I found my presence to be regarded positively. 
However, my role as such also occasionally added some distance between my 
respondents and I, where a slight reluctance to share and discuss negative aspects 
of Turkey and its migration management. These issues were part of what Sultana 
(2007) describes as people placing you in categories, something you have to 
negotiate with to form relationships with your respondents. In my own case I 
noticed my role as being complex, since I am a European but also a very young 
woman.  
This leads us to the power relations present in this fieldwork. As I 
predominantly had contact with élites, the structures and my role were highly 
complex. The contact with élites was both due to the nature of this study, and also 
my inability to speak Turkish, where the élite (who can afford to study abroad for 
example) were the ones within my reach. This makes, as mentioned in Kapoor 
(2004) my research one-sided, however that has throughout the process been 
reflected upon to ameliorate. The aim has also been to represent a limited group 
within a specific context, which is clear throughout.  
The use of language is an interesting and important part of analysing the 
power relations in field, where my ability to speak English were given plenty of 
attention in meetings with officials. Analysing this in its right context, namely the 
unequal power relations between and dominance of the Anglo-Saxian world 
throughout history, this is a significant factor in my research process. My English 
skills are giving me a position of power, and I was constantly aware of the power 
that is embedded in my language. As Sultana (2007) puts it, reflexivity is to 
reflect on how one is inserted in grids of power relations, which has been 
throughout this process. 
By choosing to focus on the local migration practitioners, who de facto occupy 
a privileged position, I am aware that the picture of Edirne and migration I receive 
is filtered in the voices of élites. However, this thesis is an account of how 
migration politics and management works in Turkey, described by the ones in 
contact with it every day through their profession or passion. They are the actors 
who shape migration management, which is the aim to study in this thesis.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Securitisation Theory  
”To study securitisation is to study the power politics of a concept” is how the so-
called Copenhagen School authors Buzan, De Wilde and Waever (1998:28) 
introduced the idea of analysing securitisation in discourse. Looking at 
securitisation as an intersubjective process allows for the identification of 
particular elements within that process to be analysed and understood, regarding 
the process as that of “constructing a shared understanding of what is considered 
and collectively responded to as a threat” (Peoples and Vaughan 2014).  
The early development of securitisation theory was understood as the 
discursive construction of a security threat, which constitutes a speech act 
(Waever 2011). One assumption is premised; that the declaration of security itself 
creates a new order that shifts from the realm of ‘normal’ (Balzacq 2005). This 
speech act of securitisation is explained as when security “is not interesting in 
itself as a sign referring to something real; it is the utterance itself that is the act” 
(Buzan et al 1998:26).  
The key concept within securitisation is the notion of a threat, which in turn is 
centred around survival (Buzan et al 1993:36). The distinguishing feature of 
securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure, which includes both survival and 
priority of action (Buzan et al 1998:25). Survival exists in relation to a referent 
object that is to be protected by any means. By a securitising move from a 
securitising actor the issue that is securitised can become an existential threat 
towards this referent object, in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary 
measures that would not have been accepted otherwise (Waever 2011). The 
audience serves to provide legitimacy for the moves of the securitising actor 
(Watson 2009:20). 
This discursive process of creating a security threat can be traced and 
identified by the concepts outlined above. These specific criteria rely on a few 
required conditions, especially in the relation between the securitising actor and 
the audience. The act of ‘speaking security’ has to be made by someone in 
authority, in the right context and according to certain pre-established conventions 
(Peoples and Vaughan 2014). There has to be a degree of acceptance between the 
securitising actor and the relevant audience, and a link should be established 
between the object being securitised and historical connotations of threats (ibid). 
In sum the process of securitisation can be defined as the ‘socially constructed 
notion of an issue as a security threat’ (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013). This process 
of securitisation ranges from ‘non-politicised–politicised–securitised’, explained 
in figure 1.  
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Figure 1, derived from Nyman (2013:54) 
 
The idea of securitisation was expanded and elaborated by, among others, 
Bigo (2000) and the Paris School who moved the theory more in to the field of 
political sociology, drawing upon Bourdieu and his concepts of field7 (Peoples 
and Vaughan 2014). Here, securitisation is seen beyond the speech act, 
recognising that notions of threats also can be produced by daily routines and 
practices, and cooperation among security experts (Bigo 2006). The approach is 
actor-based, arguing that patterns of practices and networks at the micro-level can 
reveal different processes of securitisation than detected only from official 
discourse (Waever 2011).  
The Paris School further emphasises how global insecurity and transnational 
networks of security experts creates a new arenas for securitisation that is 
expanding the dimensions of security (Bigo 2006). The focus lies on analysing the 
social construction of a threat by members of a community of security 
professionals (Bigo 2001). Merging of internal and external aspects of security, 
such as fusing and expanding the roles of police (internal) and military (external) 
are also parts of this process (Bigo 2000). This ‘blurring of lines’ is important for 
the construction of security issues in this theory, as it links the internal and 
external practices, creating a larger and more autonomous field of security 
practitioners, all concerned with ‘common’ enemies (Bigo 2000). The merging of 
internal and external aspects of security also serves to prioritise security, and 
define its importance as superior, creating further room for an expansion of a 
transnational security élite (Bigo 2006). 
 Further, the concept of security is elaborate by looking at insecurity and the 
politics of risk. Securitisation is seen as a way to manage and also create 
insecurity, and thereby creating an agenda of ‘risk management’ (Benam 2011).  
 
3.2 Securitisation of Migration 
                                                
7 The connection to Bourdieu will not be elaborated further, but the field is his theoretical concept of a particular 
arena where particular types of capital are differently valued (Bigo 2000).  
54 Jonna Nyman
 There are three key facilitating conditions that make successful securitization more 
likely: the speech act itself following the ‘grammar of security’ emphasizing priority, 
urgency and survival; the securitizing actor being in a ‘position of authority’ to maximize 
audience acceptance; and the features of the alleged ‘threat/s’ (Buzan  et al. 1998: 
33). Securitization theory distinguished security and securitization against regular 
politics and politicization, and presented a scale for identifying the status of issues, 
ranging from non- politicized to securitized, as shown in  Figure 5.1 (Buzan  et al. 
1998: 23). 
 Securitization frames issues as exceptional politics or above normal politics and decision- 
making processes, justifying ‘actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ 
(Buzan  et al. 1998: 24). As such ‘security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with 
issues as normal politics’ (Buzan  et al. 1998: 29). Refl ecting this, the Copenhagen school also 
developed the concept of desecuritization, the process which occurs when issues are moved 
out of the security sphere and back into the political sphere. Because of the particular conno-
tations and history of the concept of ‘security’, the Copenhagen school argued that ‘defense’ 
and ‘the state’ remain central to the concept in International Relations; securitizing an issue 
inevitably ‘evokes an image of threat- defense, allocating to the state an important role in 
addressing it’ (Wæver 1995: 47). While security is thus to an extent seen as a negative, as a 
failure of regular politics, it also has advantages; securitizing an issue tends to give it extra 
priority, both in terms of allocating extra attention by key policy- makers and extra funds 
(Buzan  et al. 1998: 29). When deciding on whether to securitize an issue, therefore, offi cials 
need to compare ‘the always problematic side effects of applying a mindset of security against 
the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization’ (Buzan  et al. 1998: 29). Because 
of the negative aspects of applying a mindset of security to particular issues desecuritization 
is presented as ‘the optimal long- range option’ (Buzan  et al. 1998: 29), but securitization is not 
ruled out. Because of the problematic side effects of securitization, securitization theory does 
critique the idea that security is necessarily a positive, arguing that desecuritization should be 
the aim, shifting issues back into regular politics with its accompanying bargaining processes 
(Buzan  et al. 1998: 4). 
 Since the publication of  Security in 1998, securitization theory has developed in various 
directions. It has been applied by a range of authors to an increasing number of issues 
in International Relations and in an increasing number of ways. Because of the relatively 
open nature of securitization theory as an analytical framework, it has been interpreted 
and used in many ways. Some have argued that in their focus on security speech acts, 
securitization theory should not be limited to focusing on securitizing ‘speech acts’, but 
 Figure 5.1  Issue scale, derived from Buzan  et al. (1998: 23). 
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In the context of migration, the process of securitisation covers different areas and 
sectors. Different subjects being securitised and different sectors where 
securitisation can take place mean that there is a range of possible referent objects, 
who can be articulated differently (Buzan et al 1998:45), This is however to be 
established in the following analysis. By securitising migration it is essentially the 
migrants themselves who are framed as a threat8, a threat that can be towards 
different kinds of referent objects. National culture and the societal sector are 
common, since the politics of identity tend to be articulated within the framework 
of nationality and entitlement to national resources (Peoples and Vaughan 2013). 
Migration is often also associated with crime and terrorism, which carries 
historical and widely accepted connotations of being a threat (Waever 2011).  
As described by Bigo (2006) the budget allocated to security institutions can 
help establish to what degree a threat is accepted as real. Threat management 
linked to security and migration can be detected in how highly security and 
professionalised management is emphasised in the practices of bureaucracy and 
experts (ibid). Focus on intelligence and surveillance within migration 
management, commonly linked to crime or military operations rather than 
migration, also makes the process of securitisation visible (Benam 2011).  
  
3.2.1 Transit migration and borders 
In this theoretical framework the concept of transit migration needs to be 
introduced. It is considered as one of the most important topics in EU-Turkey 
relations (Kirişci 2003) and a defining factor in the emphasis on irregular 
migration management from the EU’s side. In the context of EU and Turkey 
transit migration, especially irregular, is highly emphasised in their relation. This 
also brings forward the rationale of focusing on border security and management, 
which will run parallel to migration management in this thesis. Transit migration 
does not exist without the restrictions that surround, create and shape it (İçduygu 
2005). Here border regimes grow in significance, and in the Edirne context there 
is relevance in keeping the focus at the restrictions creating flows of transit 
migration. Focusing on transit migrants also allows for a specific focus on the 
process of migration within and through Turkey, in relation to the EU. It also 
makes it possible to avoid a focus on particular migrant groups that constitute a 
research arena of themselves, such as Syrians in Turkey.  
This also provides us an excellent bridge for moving on to the next chapter, 
which will review the relation between EU and Turkey, and their policy 
development in the field of migration and border management.  
 
                                                
8 Bigo gives an excellent view on criminalisation of migration and the creation of a ’ban-opticion’ as a structure 
that targets migrants as a group in a new form of governmentality, drawing on Foucault, in Bigo (2002).  
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4 EU, Turkey and Migration 
This chapter will introduce and outline the background of EU, Turkey and 
migration that the process of securitisation in Edirne is located within. It will 
serve to briefly analyse the main communications in EU-Turkey dialogue and 
main changes in respective migration management. Some empirical material will 
also be presented in this chapter, to further contextualise and describe migration 
management in Edirne.   
4.1 Externalisation, Europeanisation and 
Securitisation: Policy Development in the EU  
The policy development of the EU contains important elements of three parallel 
conceptual processes, important for understanding the EU’s influence over 
Turkish migration management.  
The Europeanisation9 of EU policies has played an important part in its 
securitisation of migration (Benam 2011), which is argued to have begun 
following the oil crisis of 1973. Here, the demand for labour migration decreased, 
and the Union sought to reform and restrict its migration policy (Cavlak 2013). 
The foundation for ‘Fortress Europe’ was laid with Council regulation 1612/68 
which distinguishes the right to free movement between citizens of Members 
State and nationals of third countries (Bigo and Guild 2005:17). The process of 
creating a common European framework for migration policy accelerated in the 
80s with the initiation of Schengen in 1985. This agreement framed migration as a 
subject for common and strict management among Member States, serving to 
distinguish the external and internal borders of the EU (Bigo 2009).  
With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 a Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs 
was introduced, in which migration became a subject of intergovernmental 
regulation within the EU (Huysmans 2000). In 1999 the Tampere Programme 
developed its internal security policies, which quickly became an issue of external 
border control (Léonard 2010), fusing the issue of migration with that of security 
(Bigo 2003). The following Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made European migration 
matters supranational and brought the issues of immigration, asylum and border 
control under the formal competence of the European Commission (Huysmans 
2000). This shift of sovereignty in policy making to EU-level serves to distinguish 
a larger zone of ‘inside’, put in relation to a potentially dangerous ‘outside’ 
(Benam 2011).  
                                                
9 i.e. the creation of a common, supranational legislative framework for the Member States (Benam 2011).  
  14 
The Hague Programme of 2004 made the securitisation of migration in the 
Union’s discourse visible, by creating a common immigration policy of the EU in 
order to “control unwanted flows” (Aras 2013:240). The Stockholm Programme 
of 2010 further elaborated the security architecture of the EU, emphasising border 
surveillance, data sharing and cooperation among police, military and secret 
services (Kaunert and Léonard 2010). In the Stockholm Programme a section is 
called ‘Effective policies to combat illegal immigration’, exemplifying the 
emphasis on security in EU communication (European Council 2009:52). To 
conclude, many scholars argue that this creation of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice has been driven by security focus, at the expense of the other two 
components (Kaunert and Léonard 2010). 
In 2005 the EU established its border agency Frontex, with the explicit 
mission of working directly with cooperation and coordination efforts in third 
countries (Perowski 2012). Externalisation, or ‘outsourcing’ of migration and 
border policy is symptomatic with EU’s policy development of migration 
(Menjívar 2014). The EU has sought to externalise its migration policy and create 
a ‘remote-control’ based management framework, both with political pressure and 
agreements with third countries (Aras 2013:255).  
This is where Europeanisation and securitisation goes even more hand in 
hand, creating new kinds of control mechanisms and externalising management to 
stop flows of migrants before reaching EU territory (Benam 2011). Placing the 
responsibilities of migration management further from the Union, with means as 
Readmission Agreements (RA) and financial assistance, creates this 
externalisation. The RA’s are made with third countries, valid for all Member 
States and created by the European Commission who was empowered in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. They mean that any Member State has the right to return a 
person who has entered its territory to their residence country or country of transit, 
who is obliged to accepted them if an RA is signed. This tool is commonly used 
together with incentives of visa facilitation and/or economic assistance10 (Kruse 
2002).  
4.2 The EU-Turkey Relation  
The EU-Turkey relation officially started in 1964 with the Ankara 
Agreement, but realised in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit where Turkey became a 
Candidate Country. Since, massive reforms have been made in order to align the 
country with the EU acquis (Baysan 2013). Noteworthy is that although the 
Chapter concerning migration and asylum under the Justice and Home Affairs is 
yet to be open, the reforms of Turkish migration policy have been shaped by EU 
pressure (Cavlak 2013). The EU Accession Partnership Documents for Turkey 
(APD) clearly outlined some of the most pressing issues of cooperation, and has 
continued to do so with annual Progress Reports. In the field of migration the 
                                                
10 As in the recent signing of a Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement. In this case however, only a visa-dialogue 
was opened (European Commission 2013). 
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Turkish response to the APD was to establish a Task Force on Asylum, Migration 
and Border Management in 2003 to produce a number of documents concerned 
with strengthening its border and migration management (Kirişçi 2003). The 
National Action Plan on Asylum came in 2008, and had, similarly to the APD a 
special focus on irregular migration (Aras 2013: 178). Going through all projects 
and agreements is beyond the scope of this paper. Noteworthy is however, the 
discourse used in twinning projects with EU Member States and associates, as for 
example a project between 2012-2014 conducted together with UK and Norway 
described at the DGMM website as providing; 
 
“Support to Turkey’s efforts in designing and implementing evidence based 
comprehensive policies for eliminating irregular migration related 
challenges has been provided. Furthermore, a comprehensive strategy in 
combat against irregular migration has been defined and a sustainable 
national action plan with a human rights perspective within a broader 
migration management framework based on this strategy has been created” 
(DGMM 2, 2015) 
 
The emphasis is placed both on ’combat against illegal migration’ and on the 
creation of an intelligence-driven migration management. The newly signed and 
not implemented Readmission Agreement between Turkey and EU is in the 
dialogue described as ‘efforts to combat irregular migration is a central part of 
the efforts to harmonize with the EU’ (İçduygu 2011).  
This discourse is present in many examples of the dialogues and agreements 
between EU and Turkey, showing that a securitisation of the issue is highly 
present. The word ‘combat’ is a highly securitised word, as it encourages extreme 
measures and is clearly linked to the sector of military operations.  
The RA mentioned above is also opening the dialogue on a visa-free regime 
between EU and Turkey, initiating a Roadmap emphasising cooperation in order 
to combat illegal immigration more effectively (European Commission, 
IP/13/1259, 2013). This agreement emphasises the role of Frontex providing 
assistance to Turkey in its missions, and enhance operational cooperation between 
the two. A Memorandum of Understanding (Frontex 2013b) between the two 
parties was set up in 2012, aimed to assist Turkey in following the Roadmap 
Toward Visa-Liberalisation11 and secure its border as part of the accession 
process. It also includes deployment of Frontex experts in Turkey and a more 
organised exchange of information and risk analysis (Sert 2013). 
4.3 Transit Migration and Migration Management in 
Turkey  
The nature of migration has changed rapidly in Turkey over the past years. From 
being considered predominantly as a country of departure and transit, it has 
                                                
11 The document that was exchanged for the Readmission Agreement with EU. It contains very specific points to 
be followed in order to begin a visa-facilitation dialogue (European Commission 2013).  
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increasingly become a destination country as a stable regional power in its 
troubled neighbourhood (İçduygu 2005).  
Before the Law no 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of 
2013 the legislation on Turkish migration management was highly fragmented 
with responsibilities scattered over a number of institutions following a variety of 
documents (Elitok 2013). The LFIP provided Turkey with its first comprehensive 
framework for how to manage and regulate both regular and irregular migration. 
It also introduces an entirely new administration, creating a civil authority for 
coordination of migration management (Kirişci 2012). What before was loosely 
under the responsibility of the National Police Authority is now collected under 
the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior. 
Compliance with the EU norms and regulations are reflected in the creation of the 
new framework (Tolay 2012). However its also important to note that although 
the development of the new law has been emphasised in EU-Turkey relations, 
there has also been an increasing domestic pressure and need to form a new kind 
of migration management (Elitok 2013, Kaya 2009, İçduygu 2013).  
The new law do include outspoken emphasis on highly securitised measures to 
handle migration, such as formal establishment of a “Coordination Board for 
Combating Irregular Migration” that emphasises Turkey’s “fight against irregular 
migration” (LFIP 2013:60). The law also emphasises the use of intelligence 
gathering to “determine the routes for illegal entry in and exit from Turkey and 
develop counter measures” (PowerPoint 1). 
4.3.1 Migration Management and Borders in Edirne 
It is in the light from above that the significance of Edirne becomes clear. A 
picture of the number of migrants that pass through Edirne is possible to paint by 
looking at the numbers I did access. First, a graph on the number of apprehended 
migrants in total between the years 1998-2014 accessed in PowerPoint 2. Second, 
a graph on the number of irregular migrants apprehended in Edirne between 2012 
and 2014 was provided in a PowerPoint received from the Edirne Detention 
Centre (PowerPoint 1). These can be found in their entirety in Appendix 1 and 2.  
From them, a quick calculation shows that in 2012 37 % of the total number 
of apprehended migrants in Turkey was indeed apprehended in Edirne, 41 % in 
2013 and 42 % in 2014. Suffice to say is that the region of Edirne accounts for a 
significant share of irregular migration flows in Turkey, and the apprehension in 
the Edirne area implies transit migration due to its closeness to the European 
border. 
With the numbers and nature of transit migration in Edirne established, the 
migration management in the region needs to be briefly outlined. Edirne is under 
the new administration of the LFIP a Provincial Directorate, and the base for that 
administration is located at the Edirne Detention Centre (LFIP 2013:57). The DC 
is however not new, and has been functioning previously under the authority of 
the Foreigners Police (Interview 1a, DC). The DC is responsible for migration 
management and coordination between police, Jandarma and the army with 
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regards to apprehensions at the borders. They are also responsible for processing 
and interviewing migrants and applications, as well as gathering data (ibid). The 
DC also administrates and implements the regional agreements made with Greece 
and Bulgaria, such as the Readmission Protocol of 2001 with Greece (Interview 
1b, DC). Border security is still the responsibility of the army, who follow their 
own legislation, separated from the general framework of migration management 
within the ministry (Interview 1b, DC). The army are responsible for border 
apprehensions of migrants, who are then taken to the DC for processing 
(Interview 1a, DC). 
Within the light of all this described above the conclusion that can be made is 
that EU indeed is influencing Turkey to embrace the securitisation discourse and 
practice in its migration management. This is done not only by emphasising 
‘stricter’ migration management in the dialogue with Turkey, but also by a 
number of tools directed at border security and migration management. This is 
done both within the official discourse between the two and through the dynamics 
of international cooperation and practices by experts.  
The next chapter will present an analysis of the micro-level where this process 
is played out; among local migration practitioners in the border city of Edirne. 
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5 Securitisation of Migration in Edirne 
In this chapter the case of Edirne and the empirical material gathered will be 
presented and outlined in relation to the aspects of the process of securitisation 
and how it is shown in Edirne. The scale of ‘non-politicalised–politicised–
securitised’ is also, as explained earlier, used to distinguish different levels of the 
process of securitisation. Some of the material that will be presented here also 
concerns Turkey in general and is not confined to Edirne, and will be stated here 
due to its value as indicative of the general situation. To briefly summarise, 
following the Copenhagen School discursive process of securitisation, what is 
looked at is the move where a securitising actor for an audience formulates an 
issue as a threat towards a valued referent object whose survival depends on the 
measures proposed towards the threat. Further, following the Paris School, 
practices of securitisation are looked at, with focus on internal mechanisms of 
migration practitioners, merging of internal and external12 aspects of security, 
regional, professionalised cooperation efforts. 
5.1 Politicisation  
Indicators of politicisation are present throughout the material, with the topic of 
migration expressed as recently occurring on the political arena and in debates. 
All three local politicians interviewed described migration as a ‘potential threat’ 
and a situation that had to be managed, however there was no mentions of 
strategies or political plans doing so, even when asked explicitly. This can be seen 
as a sign of the very recent politicisation of migration in Turkey, as it has not yet 
risen on the agenda of the political parties enough to be subject of any concrete 
measures. It is also a sign of how the process of migration management, and 
securitisation of it, is driven by the professionalised security bureaucracy (Bigo 
2006). This also mirrors the very top-down political structure of Turkey, where 
power is highly centralised in Ankara.  
 
“For example in the EU every political party has a section 
for migration. Here, we don’t have any. Before the Syrians 
they were invisible (…) Now the discourse has been around 
other, not humanitarian, things.” (Interview 14, ASAM) 
 
                                                
12 Internal is here defined as issues of concern within the country on a national level, where external means what 
is concerned with issues from outside of the national borders. 
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In Edirne there is also a very notable lack of organisations and activists 
concerned with migration. There are a few, interviewed in this study, but none of 
the big Turkish migration NGOs is present in the area. A representative of the 
Edirne Bar Association, who concluded that migration issues and legal 
representation of migrants in Edirne had been non-existent until recently, 
described this. He explains that when he graduated in Istanbul and returned to 
Edirne “more than 10 lawyers were representing human smugglers in court, but 
there was only one who represented migrants” (Interview 11).  
5.2 Referent Objects and Threats 
Migration is throughout the material described as an emerging or already existing 
threat, with different degrees of outspokenness. This suggests that the audience 
my respondents represent is highly responsive to the process of securitisation. 
Throughout migration is described as a problem, or looming threat, as by two 
different interviewees of the administration at the DC expressed: 
 
“It will become a problem, we can’t send back the Syrians. 
90 % of the wants to stay in Turkey (…) In Edirne it’s a 
problem that so many pass through” (Interview 1a, DC) 
 
“These foreigners will cause economic, social and political 
problems” (Interview 4, Director of DC)  
 
There are different kinds of referent objects presented, where migration is 
described as a threat towards the Turkish culture, economy and social order. The 
predominant fear is for the economy, both by migrants taking jobs and the Turkish 
expenses on migrants. This emphasis on the economic cost of migration and 
management was stressed throughout, especially the financial burden Turkey 
experienced, and fears of migrants disrupting the economy.  
 
”They are being harmful and the government is spending 
money on them. The medical bills cost more now because of 
the Syrians” (Interview 13) 
 
 Many also mentioned increasing tensions between migrants and Turkish 
nationals, and expressed fears that this would lead to conflicts. This was also 
expressed implicitly in concerns over how ‘local people’ reacted towards 
migration, and that activities of migrants led to fears among this local population. 
These statements clearly correspond to how the process of securitisation is 
present, as they explicitly make the link between a perceived threat of migrants 
and a referent object; Turkish nationals and community. A representative at the 
Municipality of Edirne made this link of identity, or more importantly a perceived 
lack of such, and security very clear by stating: 
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”Thousands of people without IDs. These people are putting 
society in a very dangerous situation (…) Security is the main 
effect [of transit migrants in Edirne]” (Interview 12)  
 
One of the sharpest statements came from a local politician. Although he was 
more outspoken about the issue than any other interviewee, similar reasoning of 
cultural clashes and bad influence from migrants were expressed in other 
interviews.  
 
”The national culture of the country is being defiled by 
immigrants (…) The immigrants in Turkey has adaptation 
problems in the cultural context. Prostitution and beggary 
have increased. If we don’t take measures as a government, 
there will be prostitution, begging and theft in cities where 
there wasn’t before” (Interview 6, CHP) 
 
Some respondents accused migrants for bringing diseases and being harmful, 
stealing and not pay rent (Interview 14, Interview 7). Similar descriptions of how 
migrants were perceived was mentioned:  
 
“Syrians and refugees are regarded as disturbing elements, 
destroying culture etc” (Interview 10) 
 
An interesting aspect was how this articulation of a threat towards the national 
culture was only present when it came to migrants, and no fears that the EU 
Accession Process would lead to any similar. Some material even presented 
migrants as a threat to the EU-Turkey relation itself. The governor of Edirne 
explicitly made a link that was present in other material too, that migration was 
harming the country’s international relations: 
 
“Turkey is not happy about border crossings. It disturbs 
relations between countries.” (Interview 4, Governor of 
Edirne) 
5.2.1 Proposed Measures  
What kind of measures needed was not very commonly mentioned as a topic in 
the interviews, but kept reoccurring in the PowerPoints. In the communication 
between EU and Turkey, measures are commonly spoken about as described in 
section 4, and the views within the material indicates that a similar discourse of 
’something has to be done’ is present in this case. Some drastic measures were 
proposed in interviews: 
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“If the number of Syrians continue to increase, we won’t be 
able to stand it and we will have to seal our borders” 
(Interview 8, MHP) 
 
Following the process of securitisation and identifying whether or not an issue 
is treated within the range of normal politics or calls for extraordinary measures 
(Waever 2011), the material gathered suggest that migration is increasingly 
considered a situation within the extraordinary. It is outlined as a potential or 
actual threat, and commonly described as a problem without any given solution 
and with unforeseen consequences for the future.  
Following Bigo’s (2006) reasoning on how budget allocations to security 
institutions can help reveal how widely accepted a threat is, material found in a 
PowerPoint from a Frontex Meeting describing plans to enhance border security 
in Turkey shows high priority on security. It also explicitly prioritises investments 
in border security; 
 
“[The] Turkish Government has allocated significant 
amounts of budget especially for the land borders recently 
and performed huge investments (…) Projected total cost of 
the system is above 100 million Euros.” (PowerPoint 3)  
5.3 The Relation Between the Audience and 
Securitising Actor 
This section will describe and discuss tensions and compliance in the relation 
between my respondents and EU or Turkey. To conduct a successful securitisation 
the relation between the securitising actor and the audience needs to be of the kind 
that the audience accepts the securitising move, i.e. some sort of authority needs 
to be present (Buzan et al 1998:25). 
To briefly summarise the use of actor and audience relationship in this 
section, two main relations are focused on. The first is the less clear and more 
indirect, but highly relevant, of EU and Edirne. The other is the main feature in 
the material concerning the relation between Turkey and my sample in Edirne, to 
further discuss the different ways securitisation is present.  
 
 “We are doing our homework, which was given from the 
EU, we are doing our best. But we feel like we have 
confidence, that we don’t need, we don’t have to any more. 
But still, we are doing our homework. [We’re] frustrated 
with the EU. We’re tired of their attitude” (Interview 7, 
AKP) 
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This ambivalent quote captures how my respondents most commonly described 
the relationship with EU. It further shows how the process of securitisation is 
located within practices and that the relation between EU as an audience is highly 
flawed by distrust and a fatigue with EU conditionality. The administration of the 
DC expressed a similar view, where the following quote describes this awareness 
of EU agenda and compliance in practice but slight resistance in discourse. When 
asked of the aims of regional cooperation, especially the monthly local meetings 
with Greece conducted since 2011, the response given was: 
 
”The main aim of the cooperation is border security, at least 
from the Greek side. The secondary aim is to reduce the 
number of migrants.” (Interview 1b, DC) 
 
The ambiguity of showing understanding towards the EU behaviour in the quote 
below is through the way the respondent puts the threat of migration toward 
Turkey in relation to the EU’s migration management. It places the emphasis on 
the contrast between the humanist acceptance of Turkey and the protectionist view 
of the EU:  
 
”…if we accept all migrants passing through Turkey, then 
the number of refugees in our country will be equal to that 
of Bulgaria or Greece. And it will make us a poor country. 
Europe doesn’t want to take this responsibility, because 
they consider their own economy and social and cultural 
structure…”(Interview 5, EDAK) 
 
 
Similarly, other respondents expressed negativity with regards to migration 
management in EU-Turkey relation. This tension in describing both EU and 
migrants as a problem shows the ambiguity of the securitisation process within 
this context of Edirne. As showed earlier migration and migrants are described as 
threats towards different aspects of Turkey, but responses also show an awareness 
and problematisation of this in relation to the EU: 
 
“They told us to open our borders and they assured us that 
they would help us in every way. But now, no one helps us. 
We are trying to deal with this problem on our own (…) 
European border policy is planned according to Europe’s 
own interests. They always do what’s best for them. If it suits 
them, they say they will open their borders and everyone will 
be able to move freely. If it doesn’t suit them, they build walls 
and wire fences along the borders.” (Interview 8, MHP) 
  
“Immigration occurs because of the immigrants who wants to 
go to Europe. If there wasn’t a Europe, there would be no 
such thing as migration. Since Turkey is a bridge to Europe, 
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the immigration problem in our country can not be solved 
easily.” (Interview 6, CHP) 
 
Among representatives from civil society both Frontex and the EU was sharply 
criticised for both treating migrants very badly and for pushing the responsibility 
to Turkey. “EU is using Turkey as its warehouse” (Interview 10) was an opinion 
expressed in different form. Very harsh criticism was expressed towards Frontex 
and its practices on the border.  
 
“…the situation got worse for immigrants. Because Frontex 
began to use violence on them. Before Frontex the Greek 
officers were not nice to migrants either. But now the 
situation is worse than ever […] they are being killed by 
Frontex officers” (Interview 9) 
  
“Frontex is the dirty hands of Europe. They have weapons 
and they kill people” (Interview 10)  
 
At a visit to the DC I encountered a military officer who had just brought in three 
new migrants, apprehended at the border. He was notably upset, and said: 
 
“They hurt them, they push them back, they send their dogs 
at them. […] What is this Europe? They do like this and 
they don’t let us in to the EU? We are the only one who care 
for them [the migrants].” (Interview 1b, DC) 
 
These quotes show the tension in the relation between EU and Edirne. The 
practices of the EU are very present in this area, and they are condemned to a 
large extent. Similar to the quote above, this was expressed by many respondents, 
where the practices of the EU was put in relation to how the EU did not allow for 
Turkey to join them.  
When conducting interviews at the Detention Centre and later on with the 
Border Agency in Ankara, a very interesting discrepancy was detected. While the 
official material, confirmed and elaborated in interview with IBM representative 
in Ankara, describes implemented and extensive cooperation with EU and 
Frontex, and articulate EU influence over policy in the harmonisation, the same 
view was not shared by DC administration in Edirne, who on the contrary 
expressed Turkish independence in developing border and migration 
management.  
This discrepancy will, in the light of what is described in the next section, 
suggest what Bigo 2000) mentions – that the dynamics of securitisation are 
present among the practices of the security and migration management in Edirne, 
without particular regards to the official agenda. While many in my sample 
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articulate a resistance towards the official discourse of securitisation, the practices 
and how they are described13 suggests securitisation.  
5.4 Practices of securitisation  
In Edirne the process of securitisation is highly visible within the transnational 
and national practices conducted from the Edirne DC. The interviews conducted 
at the DC became more informative and less ‘perception-oriented’ than the others, 
since the respondents were so firmly put in their professional role at their 
workplace. This provided excellent material on how the internal and regional 
management of migration works, and although far from ‘mapping the practices 
and processes within in detail’ as put forward by Bigo (2009), gave a fragment of 
how the practices of securitisation looks in Edirne.  
Some of the practices described at the DC show significant securitisation, such 
as the emphasis of coordination of border management and detection through 
surveillance in cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria, administered at the Edirne 
DC. The local meetings conducted with Greece every month, where the emphasis 
is on “exchange of data, cases and statistics” (Interview 1a, DC), show this 
extension of security networks (Bigo 2006), and transnational security 
management.  
Increased emphasis on intelligence and data gathering, which highly indicates 
securitisation of practices, and expansion of the security field14 was mentioned in 
the interviews as a shift of focus in Turkish migration management. The 
administration of the DC emphasised this in their daily work, describing that their 
interviews conducted with migrants also involved collection of “what rotes they 
are taking, purposes, if legal what border gates,  [if they used] smugglers” 
(Interview 1a, DC). This was also framed in relation to the EU, where the BMA 
representative mentioned that “[the instalment of] RABIT teams 15  made 
communication to increase between Turkey and Greece [with] information flows, 
cameras etc”  (Interview 15). 
5.4.1 Merging of internal and external security aspects 
The creation of DGMM as a civil authority in the new LFIP is very interesting 
within the framework of the Paris School discussion of expansion of the security 
field (Bigo 2006). A presentation on the new administration retrieved concludes 
this emphasis on a securitised view of cooperative, transnational efforts: 
 
                                                
13 Here especially among the interviews conducted with the administration of the DC. 
14 By emphasising intelligence and surveillance gathering in migration management, a clear framing of migration 
as an exeptional security threat, comparable to transnational crime or other related topics, occur (Léonard 2010). 
15 RABIT teams are small, specialised intervention teams employed by Frontex at the border between Greece 
and Turkey before the Operation Poseidon began in 2009 (Frontex 2013a) 
  25 
”Migration, especially irregular migration is becoming a 
global threat day by day […] Irregular migration can only be 
controlled by international cooperation and common action” 
(PowerPoint 216)  
 
The interview with IBM in Ankara also made this merging visible. According 
to him, the different institutions working with border management are coordinated 
by the Governorship, which plays a big role in management of the borders 
according to the new law (Interview 15). Similarly, the former Director of the DC 
expressed hopes of a new authority dealing with the borders that would be tied to 
the DGMM (Interview 3). The reforms in Turkish migration management may 
suggest that a merging of internal and external security is indeed underway, 
enlarging the capacity of the country to manage this sort of created insecurity 
(Bigo 2000).  
Further, the practices described at the DC such as how they are responsible for 
daily communication between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in border detections, 
with a “daily hotline” between the three (Interview 1a, DC), emphasise a similar 
securitisation. This hotline is used for detecting migrants in the respective border 
zones, i.e. before they are able to cross to the territory of the EU (ibid). These 
practices highly suggest that although the responsibilities of external and external 
security management is still officially separated they are beginning to merge, 
especially in relation to the practices conducted in cooperation with the EU.  
                                                
16 From bilateral meeting between Turkey and Greece. 
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6 Conclusion  
This thesis has aimed at answering the question of how the process of 
securitisation of migration is visible in practices and discourses of local migration 
practitioners in Edirne. It has done so by locating empirical material from Edirne 
in the framework of securitisation theory. The attempt has been to somewhat map 
and delineate the different levels and concepts where securitisation is present. 
This has led us to interesting results, revealing a complex picture of influence, and 
resistance expressed towards it. There is a clear process of securitising influence 
from the EU to Turkey on a national level, which is adhered in the national 
legislation, and thus creates the basis for daily practices at the Edirne Detention 
Centre. These practices then form their own dynamics, and by the outline above 
the process of securitisation seems to be present in the way the organisations 
responsibilities are presented. The merging of internal and external aspects of 
security also suggest that this process is well underway, which would be 
interesting to further study when then law has been more implemented.  
The expressed relation with the EU is really interesting, as it shows high 
degrees of both compliance and resistance in adhering the discourse of 
securitisation of migration. This is expressed at the local level, in contradiction to 
the national Turkish level that seems to be more directed towards harmonising the 
EU acquis in its entirety. However, there are some areas of dispute in the official 
communication, with similar areas articulated in my sample, such as fears of 
becoming the EU’s ‘dumping ground’.  
The discourse of securitisation, describing migration as a threat towards 
different referent objects, is however highly present among my sample, suggesting 
that the process of securitisation exists within the context of fears toward national 
identity, but only with regards to migration and migrants. In relation to the EU no 
such fears are expressed; hence the securitisation is indeed directed to migrants 
and not to national security. The tension between a present discursive process of 
securitisation of migration, and an outspoken resistance towards the EU’s such is 
interesting.  
Here we can conclude that the process of securitisation in Edirne is highly 
influenced by the EU, where the closeness of Edirne to the EU borders may 
explain the higher degree of resistance towards its practices.  
To conclude the securitisation of migration in Edirne is a highly complex 
process, with influence of the EU shaping practices and discourse, and an 
articulated resistance in Edirne towards the Union. These are very interesting 
aspects to discuss further, as the issue of migration continues to characterise the 
relation between EU and Turkey. 
  27 
7 References  
7.1 Literature 
 
Aras, N. Ela Gökalp. “A Multi-level and Multi-sited Analysis of the European 
Union’s Immigration and Asylum Policy Concerning Irregular Migration and 
its Implications for Turkey: Edirne and Izmir as two Major Gateway Cities.” 
Diss. Middle East Technical University, (2013). 
Balzacq, Thierry. "The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience 
and context." European journal of international relations 11.2 (2005): 171-
201. 
Baškarada, Saša. "Qualitative Case Study Guidelines." The Qualitative 
Report19.40 (2014): 1-18. 
Baysan, Alper. "Multiple Arenas and Diverse Techniques of Securitisation: The 
Case of the EU’s Visa Regime towards Turkey." Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 9.5 (2013). 
Benam, Çiğdem H. "Emergence of a ’Big Brother’ in Europe: border control and 
securitization of migration”. Insight Turkey (Ankara) 13.3 (2011). 
Biehl, Kristen. "Migration ‘Securitization’and its Everyday Implications: an 
examination of Turkish asylum policy and practice." CARIM Summer School 
2009 – Best Participants Series 01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, San Domenico Fiesole (FI), European University Institute (2009). 
Bigo, Didier. "8 When two become one." International Relations Theory and the 
Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community (2000): 
171. 
Bigo, Didier. "5 Migration and security." Controlling a new migration world 4 
(2001): 121. 
Bigo, Didier. "Security and immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality 
of unease." Alternatives: global, local, political 27.1 (2002): S63. 
Bigo, Didier and Elspeth Guild,. Controlling frontiers: free movement into and 
within Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, (2005). 
Bigo, Didier. "Globalized (in) security: the field and the ban-opticon." Illiberal 
Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (In) Security Games, L’Harmattan: 
Paris(2006): 5-49. 
Bigo, Didier. "Immigration controls and free movement in Europe." International 
Review of the Red Cross 91.875 (2009): 579-591. 
Bürgin, Alexander. "European Commission's agency meets Ankara's agenda: why 
Turkey is ready for a readmission agreement." Journal of European Public 
Policy 19.6 (2012): 883-899. 
Bryman, Alan. “Social research methods” Oxford university press, (2012). 
Buzan, B., Waever O Kelstrup, M., & Lemaitre, P. “Identity, migration and the 
new security agenda in Europe. London: Pinter (1993). 
  28 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever & Jaap deWilde. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Rienner. (1998) 
Carrera, Sergio, Elspeth Guild, and Didier Bigo. "What Future for the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice? Recommendations on EU Migration and 
Borders Policies in a Globalising World." Recommendations on EU 
Migration and Borders Policies in a Globalising World (March 20, 2008). 
CEPS Policy Brief 156 (2008). 
Cavlak, Hakan. "The Impact of the EU on Turkish Asylum and Immigration 
Policy." Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 1.1 (2013). 
Elitok, Seçil Paçacı. "Turkish migration policy over the last decade: a gradual 
shift towards better management and good governance." Turkish Policy 
Quarterly 12.1 (2013): 161-172. 
England, Kim V. L. ‘Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality and Feminist 
Research’, The Professional Geographer, 46 (1): 80-89. (1994) 
Emerson, Michael, and Nathalie Tocci. "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: 
Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy. CEPS EU-Turkey Working 
Papers No. 1, 1 August 2004." (2004): 35. 
Erkut, Gülden, and C. Özgen. "European Union’s Conditionality on Turkey’s 
Regional Policy and Institutional Restructuring for Cross-border 
Cooperation."Regional Studies Association, Shaping EU Regional Policy: 
Economic Social and Political Pressures (2006). 
Geiger, Martin, and Antoine Pécoud, eds. “The politics of international migration 
management”. Granite Hill Publishers, (2010) 
Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 38.5 (2000): 751-777. 
İçduygu, Ahmet. "Transit Migration in Turkey: Trends, Patterns, and 
Issues."European University Institute Research Report 4 (2005). 
İçduygu, Ahmet. “The Irregular Migration Corridor between the EU and Turkey: Is It 
Possible to Block It with a Readmission Agreement?” EU-US Immigration Systems 
2011/14 (San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies European University Institute, (2011), 12–13, 15 
İçduygu, Ahmet. "9 The international migration and citizenship debate in 
Turkey." Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish 
Experiences (2013): 196. 
Kapoor Ilan (2004) ‘Hyper-self-reflexive development? Spivak on representing 
the Third World ‘Other’’, Third World Quarterly, 25 (4): 627–647 
Karyotis, Georgios, and Dimitris Skleparis. "Qui Bono? The Winners and Losers 
of Securitising Migration." Griffith Law Review 22.3 (2013): 683-706. 
Kaşli, Zeynep. "From Antagonism to Partnership on and across the Greek-Turkish 
Border: Redefining the Self and the Other on the Borders of EU?." 21st 
International Conference of Europeanists. Ces, 2014. 
Kaunert, Christian, and Sarah Léonard. "After the Stockholm programme: an area 
of freedom, security and justice in the European Union?." European 
Security 19.2 (2010): 143-149. 
Kaya, Ibrahim. "Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: adopting the EU acquis?." Migration 
Policy Centre; [CARIM-South]; CARIM Research Report; (2009): 16 
Keser, Hasan. "Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish asylum and 
immigration policy in the light of the central and Eastern European 
experience." Ankara review of European studies 5.3 (2006): 130. 
  29 
Kirişci, Kemal. "The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European 
Union-Turkish Relations." Turkish Studies 4.1 (2003): 79-106. 
Kirişci, Kemal. ”Border management and EU-Turkish relations: convergence or 
deadlock”. European University Institute, 2007. 
Kirişci, K. (2008) ‘Managing irregular migration in Turkey: a political-bureaucratic 
perspective’, Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, 
Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2008/61. 
Kirişci, Kemal. "Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of 
It?."Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and 
Opportunities (2012): 63. 
Kruse, Imke. "The EU’s Policy on Readmission of Illegal Migrants." Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies (2002), retrieved 2015-02-01 at 
http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kruse.Imke.pdf 
Léonard, Sarah. "EU border security and migration into the European Union: 
FRONTEX and securitisation through practices." European Security 19.2 
(2010): 231-254. 
Menjívar, Cecilia. "Immigration Law Beyond Borders: Externalizing and 
Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization." Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 10 (2014): 353-369. 
Ministry of Interior, “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management 
Publications No 8 (2013) 
Nyman, Jonna. "5 Securitization theory." in Shepherd, Laura J., ed. “Critical approaches 
to security: an introduction to theories and methods”. Routledge, (2013) 
Peoples, Columba, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. Critical security studies: an 
introduction. Routledge, (2014). 
Perowski, Nina. “A normative assessment of the aims and practices of the 
Europan border management agency Frontex” Working Paper Series No.81 
(2012) 
Schaub, Max, Humanitarian problems relating to migration in the Turkish-Greek 
border region; The crucial role of civil society organisations, Centre on 
Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford (2013) 
Şemşit, Sühal. "Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the 
EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?." CEU Political 
Science Journal 04 (2008): 365-387. 
Sert, Deniz. “Turkey’s integrated border management strategy” Turkish Policy 
Quarterly vol. 12:1 (2013) 
Sultana, Farhana (2007) ‘Reflexivity, Positionality and Participatory Ethics: 
Negotiating Fieldwork Dilemmas in International Research’, ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 6 (3): 374-385. 
Toğral, Burcu. "Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on 
Turkish Migration Practices." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International 
Relations 11.2 (2012). 
Tolay, Juliette. "Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s 
Immigration Policies." Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges 
and Opportunities (2012): 39. 
Wæver, Ole. "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New'Schools' in Security Theory 
and their Origins between Core and Periphery." annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Montreal. 2004. 
  30 
Wæver, Ole. "Politics, security, theory." Security Dialogue 42.4-5 (2011): 465-
480. 
Watson, Scott D. ”The securitization of humanitarian migration: digging moats and 
sinking boats”. Routledge advances in international relations and global 
politics;74: (2009). 
7.2 Reports and Documents 
 
Amnesty International, ‘The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights 
Violations Against Migrants at Europe’s Borders’ (July 2014), available at 
<http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/eur_050012014__fortress_e
urope_complete_web.pdf> 
Frontex, 2013a. Annual Risk Report 2013, retrived 2015-03-21 at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_An 
alysis_2013.pdf 
Frontex 2013b, General Report 2012, Retrived 2014-09-15 at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-signs-a-memorandum-of-understanding-with-
turkey-UBa8Ya  
European Commission, IP/13/1259 (2013), Brussels: Retrived 2015-03-17 at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1259_en.htm 
European Commission “Roadmap toward visa-liberalisation” (2013), Brussels 
Retrived 2015-03-17 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-
roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf 
Council of the European Union. "The Stockholm Programme–an open and secure 
Europe serving and protecting the citizens." (2009). Retrieved 2015-05-10 at  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:
en:PDF 
DGMM 1, Directorate General of Migration Management, Turkey (2015), retrived 
2015-04-15 at: 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/history-of-migration_915_1026 
DGMM 2, Directorate General of Migration Mangement, Turkey (2015), retrieved 
2015-04-20 at: 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/finalized-projects-by-directorate-general-of-
migration-management_917_1068_4731_icerik 
FIDH, Migreurop, EMHRN “Frontex – Between Greece and Turkey: at the border of 
denial” (2014) Retrived 2015-02-15 at  
http://www.frontexit.org/en/docs/49-frontexbetween-greece-and-turkey-the-border-
of-denial/file 
Pro Asyl, ‘Pushed Back. Systematic Human Rights Violations against Refugees in 
the Aegean Sea and at the Greek-Turkish Land Border’ (7 November 2013), 
available at 
<http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fmdam/l_EU_Fluechtlingspolitik/proasyl_
pushed_back_24.01.14_a4.pdf> 
 
 
  31 
7.3 Interviews 
Interview 1a: Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-12 
Interview 1b: Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-20 
Interview 2: Director of Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-26 
Interview 3: Former Director of Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-26 
Interview 4: The Governor of Edirne 2015-01-12 
Interview 5: EDAK, a voluntary emergency assistance organisation, Edirne, 
2015-02-22 
Interview 6: CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) leader, 
Edirne, 2015-02-23 
Interview 7: AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) 
youth branch leader, Edirne, 2015-01-27 
Interview 8: MHP, Milliyetçi Harkeret Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) 
leader, Edirne, 2015-02-20 
Interview 9: Lawyer, Edirne, 2015-02-13 
Interview 10: Local activist, Edirne, 2015-02-23 
Interview 11: Bar Association representative, Edirne, 2015-03-01  
Interview 12: Municipality representative, Edirne 2015-03-05 
Interview 13: Translator, Edirne, 2015-03-11 
Interview 14: Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants,  
Ankara, 2015-03-16 
Interview 15: Border Management Agency representative, Ankara 2015-03-17 
 
7.4 Documents from Fieldwork  
PowerPoint 1: Edirne Detention Centre, prestentation from monthly, local Turkey-
Greece meetings, 2015-02-18, accessed 2015-02-20 
PowerPoint 2: Presentation at the 10th Bi-lateral Experts Meeting between Turkey and 
Greece, Ankara, 2015-01-13,14, accessed 2015-03-17 
PowerPoint 3: Border Management Agency, Meeting with Frontex, 2013-05-14, 
accessed 2015-03-17 
 
 
Image: Lindvall, Klara, 2015, View from the Edirne Detention Centre, [Front page 
photograph] 
 
 
 
  32 
8 Appendix  
Appendix 1: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended 
on Turkish National Borders Between 1998 and 2014  
 
 
Retrieved from PowerPoint 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  33 
Appendix 2: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended 
in the Edirne Border Area Between 2011 and 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retrieved from PowerPoint 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
